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ARGUMENT
Before proceeding to the merits of Appellee's (hereinafter
"Freeport") arguments, Appellant

(hereinafter

"Enerco"),

must

address certain factual allegations made in the "Statement of the
Case" in Freeport!s Brief.

Enerco is troubled that it must use

valuable space in its Brief to refute such "factual" allegations.
In the Statement, and at other places in its Brief, Freeport
refers to one of the thieves in question as "Enercofs employee."
That is simply incorrect.
Staffing

That individual was provided by SOS

Services, Inc., a licensed and well-known temporary

service agency.

He was SOS1 employee and was nothing more than a

temporary independent contractor as to Enerco.
Pages 3-7 of Freeport1s Brief make multiple incorrect factual
allegations.

Freeport alleges that it "has no control over the

goods a tenant might choose to store in its leased premises."
(Appellee's Brief, p. 3).

This is directly contradictory to

Paragraph 2 its own Lease Agreement which specifies what the Tenant
can (and cannot) have in the building (R. 1266).

Appellee's Brief

states that Freeport cannot take a lien or security interest in
Enercofs goods.

This statement is not only unsupported, but is

contrary to Utah law which clearly indicates that "Lessors shall
have a lien for rent due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee
brought or kept upon the leased premises" (U.C.A. 38-3-1).
Freeport alleges in its Brief that it "has never undertaken to
provide security for any tenant" and that "the buildings do not
come equipped with security systems" (Appellee's Brief, p. 5).
1

This

flies

in

the

face

of

Freeportfs

own

promotional

and

advertising materials given to Enerco to induce it to become a
tenant which represent, under the title "A Word About the Basics":
Freeport is protected by five miles of 10 foot chain link
fencing.
Gates are manned or locked during hours of
darkness. A roving security guard patrols the Center's
735 fenced acres on weekends, at night, and on holidays.
(R.

1403).

The

same materials

clearly

represent

that

"an

electronic surveillance system connects each building with the
Clearfield City Fire Department as well as the Freeport Center
administrative offices and patrol vehicle." (Id.)
The "support" for almost all of these improper allegations is
an affidavit signed by Freeport's General Manager (R. 1254-59).
When that affidavit was filed in the trial court, it was so rife
with contradictory statements and made so many inappropriate legal
conclusions that Enerco was forced to file a "Motion to Strike
Portions

of

f

Supplemental Affidavit

of Stephen

L. Barrett1."

Unfortunately, the trial judge never ruled on that motion, and
Freeport has continued to rely heavily on that improper affidavit
as almost the sole support for its factual allegations.
Freeport!s Brief also asserts, for the first time in this
case, that in the Lease Agreement in question, Enerco "releases"
its claims against Freeport and that the Agreement
contemplates in Paragraph 18 that if Enerco1s property
were stolen from the building it was renting, Enerco
would indemnify Freeport for any liabilities . . . in
connection with any theft of . . . goods . . . located on
the premises.
(Appellee!s Brief, pp. 4-5).

The reason this argument has not

previously been raised is that when the full language of Paragraph
2

18 is read, as opposed to the language Freeport has conveniently
omitted in the quotation in its Brief, the inapplicability of the
indemnification provisions in the Agreement becomes obvious:
Tenant shall pay and shall indemnify and hold Landlord
and its principals, employees and agents harmless from
and against any and all liabilities . . . unless due to
the negligence or wilful misconduct of Landlord, or its
principals, employees or agents, in connection with any
and all of the following:
(b) any theft of or damage to or destruction of
goods, wares, merchandise and all other property of
Tenant or others located on the premises or arising from
Tenant's use of the premises.
(R. 1269, emphasis added).

There are many other incorrect "facts"

alleged in Freeportfs Brief but because of the page limitations of
this Brief, Enerco now turns to Freeportfs legal arguments.
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REJECTED ENERCO1S
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

Freeport!s first error on this issue is that it attempts to
artificially restrict Enerco!s breach of contract claims to the
single Lease Agreement between the parties. Since the beginning of
this case, Enerco has asserted that the contractual breaches extend
far beyond that single document.
In its final Amended Complaint, Enerco did not limit its
breach of contract claims to the Lease Agreement (R. 854). W h e n
Freeport filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, Enerco filed a
Memorandum in Opposition (R. 1353-1403) which also made it clear
that the Lease Agreement was only part of Enerco' s breach of
contract claim. That memorandum indicated that "James Kim was also
given other materials at the time the lease was entered into and
was also given verbal assurances and representations."
3

(R. 1357).

Later, that memorandum also unequivocally stated that "Freeport
also errs in trying to assert that the only agreements between the
parties were contained in one written lease agreement" (R. 1364)
and then explained:
In addition to the express written agreements, there
were multiple breaches of verbal contracts. As indicated
above,
plaintiff
testified
in
his
Answers
to
Interrogatories that:
It was represented that security guards would
protect the gates of the Freeport Center and
that the security guards in addition to the
other security measures set forth above would
protect his property. Mr. Kim specifically
remembers being told that "there is ample
security here" and that his property would be
safe, and that employees of Freeport had never
heard of anyone stealing property from
tenants.
(R. 1368).

Enerco testified in the above-referenced Answers to

Interrogatories that other promises and contractual agreements were
made. Enercofs President again so testified in his affidavit filed
with the trial court (R. 1420-23).
In its Appellantfs Brief, Enerco again made it clear that it
was appealing not only the trial court's interpretation of the
lease agreement, but also its finding that no other contractual
breaches occurred.
Presented

Enerco clearly listed one of the "Issues

for Review" as "[w]hether the trial court erred in

refusing, as a matter of law, to look beyond the contract between
the parties and consider the particular facts of this case . . . ."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 2).

Enerco also argued that "evidence

including Freeport!s sales brochures, verbal promises and other
actions

of

Freeport's

employees"
4

should

be

considered

in

determining whether the breach of contract claims were appropriate.
(Appellantfs Brief, p. 27). While Freeport may wish to limit the
contractual obligations to the Lease Agreement, doing so would
ignore a great deal of relevant evidence and the relevant pleadings
placed before both the trial court and this Court.
The clear evidence before the trial court on this issue was
largely uncontroverted, even in Mr. Barrett's affidavit. Freeport
ignores the undisputed facts alleged in Enerco!s Brief that (1) at
the time the lease was entered into, Freeport1s General Manager
"gave Mr. Kim verbal assurances and representations regarding the
security at the Freeport Center;" (2) he told Mr. Kim that "there
would be security guards protecting the gate;" (3) he told Mr. Kim
that "there is ample security here;" (4) he told Mr. Kim that
"Enercofs property would be safe;" (5) Freeport gave Mr. Kim
printed materials unequivocally promising ten foot chain link
fencing, roving security guards, and an electronic surveillance
system; (6) Enerco relied on all of these promises and materials in
agreeing to lease from Freeport; (7) Freeportfs management took Mr.
Kim's keys while he was out of town (while the thefts occurred) so
that no one else could gain access to his warehouse; and (8) the
thieves repeatedly drove load after load of Enercofs unique and
highly-identifiable military equipment past Freeportfs guards on
open flat bed trailers while the guards simply smiled and waved.
When all of these facts, verbal promises and many written
materials are also considered, especially in a light most favorable

5

to Enerco, it is clear that breaches of contract occurred.

The

trial court erred in not considering any of these undisputed facts.
Freeport's Brief argues that all of this undisputed evidence
should simply be ignored because of an integration clause in the
Lease Agreement.

First, even Freeport acknowledges in its Brief

that such an integration clause is meaningless if ambiguities exist
in the contract.

Those ambiguities are discussed below.

Second,

the contract in question, which was signed on July 9, 1993 for a
period of only six months (R. 1265) does not preclude subsequent
agreements and verbal contracts being made, especially considering
that the losses in question did not even occur until the end of
1995.

The promises, advertising,

and

actions of

Freeportfs

management continued right up to the time of the losses.
Third, if Freeport is going to use the Lease Agreement as a
shield and allege that it prevents consideration of all other
evidence (as it successfully argued in the trial court), then it
has the burden of showing the applicability of the Agreement on
which it relies.

Freeportfs Brief consistently refers only to a

single Lease Agreement located at R. 1265-76. That Agreement only
covers a period "beginning on the 1st day of August 1993, and
ending on the 31st day of January, 1994." (R. 1265).
From the dates and references to the record acknowledged in
Freeport!s Brief, it appears that the trial court relied on an
Agreement which was not even in effect at the time of the losses in
question.

Enerco represents to this Court that after a diligent

search, Enerco does not believe that any subsequent agreements or
6

written contracts exist.

Obviously, Freeport has never provided

subsequent agreements to the trial court, or they would be part of
this Courtfs record. According to the only Lease Agreement before
the trial court or this Court, the written agreement

ff

end[ed] on

the 31st day of January, 1994," almost two years before the losses
in question occurred.
If no written lease agreement existed after January 31, 1994,
the question obviously becomes what did control the parties1
relationship at the time of the losses.

In Thomas J. Peck & Sons,

Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446
(1973), this Court explained what occurs when a lease agreement
expires and the tenant retains possession and pays rent:
the tenancy is not dependent on the terms of the invalid
lease, but is implied by the law from the occupancy of
the premises under an agreement, and . . . such a tenant
cannot justly be treated as a trespasser.
Id. at 192, emphasis added.

This Court continued:

The question then arises as to what are the rights of the
parties under that type of landlord and tenant
relationship. In the absence of an express agreement
between them, the law necessarily implies that they will
meet their obligations to each other on terms that are
reasonable and fair to both.
Id.

This Court then held that under such facts:
Some [courts] have ruled that a tenancy at will is
created.
But a greater number hold that the tenancy
should be month to month, or year to year. A basic
principle which seems to emerge from these cases is that
even though the lease be invalid, its terms may be looked
to and given some consideration, along with other
factors, in arriving at what is fair and reasonable in
adjustment of the rights of the parties.

Id. at 192-93, emphasis added.

As will be set forth in detail

below, this "reasonableness" standard is exactly the same standard
7

which should also be applied in determining whether Enerco's claim
for negligence is appropriate.
In

sum,

all

of

the undisputed

contracts, representations

evidence

and other documents

of

other

oral

should not be

ignored in determining whether breaches of contract occurred simply
because of an integration clause in a Lease Agreement which had
ended long before the losses in question occurred. While the terms
of that Agreement may be given "some consideration," they should
only be considered

"along with other factors" in determining

whether promises and obligations were breached.

Those "other

factors" were improperly excluded by the trial court.
Even if all of this additional evidence were ignored and only
the Lease Agreement were considered, breaches of contract still
exist for two reasons. First, Paragraph 15 of the Lease Agreement
unequivocally required that "[i]f the demised premises or any part
thereof shall be damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty,
Landlord shall promptly repair all such damage and restore the
demised premises without expense to Tenant."

(R. 1272). Theft and

break-ins are certainly "casualties" as used in the Agreement.
Unfortunately, Enercofs readily visible large delivery doors were
not repaired "promptly," as it is undisputed they were kicked in
and "left in pieces" for the perpetrators to gain access night
after night over an extended period of time. That is what allowed
such an extensive amount of property to be removed
warehouse.

from the

Had Freeport really had "roving security guards" or

"electronic surveillance systems" as promised, Freeport would have
8

seen the destroyed delivery doors. Freeport!s failure to "promptly
repair" the doors was a breach of the Agreement.
Enerco

also

believes

that

Freeport

breached

the

Lease

Agreement by refusing to allow Enerco to be covered for its losses
under its insurance policy.

(It must be emphasized that Freeport

has never alleged that it did not have insurance coverage in place
for the type of loss that occurred to Enerco —

only that Enerco

was not covered under Freeportfs policy).
Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement clearly contemplates that
Freeport would maintain insurance protection on the warehouse in
question because the agreement instructed Enerco not to do anything
"which would cause an increase in insurance premiums, render the
insurance thereon void or cause cancellation thereof."
emphasis added).

(R. 1266,

Likewise, paragraph 13(B) of the Lease Agreement

even specified, to the penny, what the insurance premium would be,
and required Enerco to contribute additional funds to pay the
increased premium if the original premium exceeded that amount.
(R. 1268).

It is obvious that part of Enerco's rent was to pay the

premium, and one must ask how Enerco can be required to pay premium
increases, but not be an insured under the policy?
In GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1994),
the Utah Court of Appeals explained that a tenant is a co-insured
under its landlord's insurance policy:

"The majority hold the

landlord's insurance is presumed to be held for the tenant's
benefit as a co-insured in the absence of an express agreement to
the contrary."

Id. at 1161, emphasis added.
9

Freeport argues in its Brief that Enerco was negligent in
allowing the thefts to occur and that it should not have to
"babysit" its Tenant.

However, the GNS court explained:

When the landlord agreed to provide insurance for the
building it assumed the risk of its coinsured* s
negligence. The insurer, which has accepted one premium
covering the entire property and has assumed the risk of
the negligence of each party, ought not to be allowed to
shift the risk to any one of them.
fid, at 1161, emphasis added).

Enerco should not be required to

pay premiums as part of its rent, pay the increases in premiums if
they rise, and then be told it is not an insured.
Nowhere in the Lease Agreement is it even suggested that the
insurance in question will only cover "fire losses" as Freeport
suggests.

The Agreement only requires that the Tenant "pay any

amount by which the property insurance premiums" exceed a specified
amount.

Utah law requires that a tenant is a co-insured of the

landlord, especially when the tenant pays the premium.

At a

minimum, the language in the Agreement creates an ambiguity which
must, as a matter of law, be construed against the landlord who
prepared the document. The trial court improperly ruled that "the
GNS Partnership v. Fullmer case cited by Enerco is inapplicable to
the facts of this case" and that Freeport "had no contractual or
common-law duty to provide that insurance to Enerco." (R. 1536).
Even if the breach of contract claims were only limited to the
Lease Agreement, Freeportfs failure to promptly repair the delivery
doors and Freeport!s refusal to extend its insurance coverage to

10

Enerco breached

its contractual

duties.

Ambiguities exist *

(assuming the Agreement is even valid because of the January 31,
1994 expiration date), and other evidence should be considered to
determine what is "reasonable and fair" to the parties.
When

all

of

the

management, and verbal

other

documents,

acts

of

Freeportfs

agreements made with Enerco are also

considered (the existence and veracity of which Freeport does not
even challenge in its Brief), there is no question that actionable
breaches of contract occurred.

The trial court should not have

entered summary judgment against Enerco on that claim.
POINT II. ENERCO IS NOT ASSERTING AN IMPLIED CONTRACT CLAIM
As "Point II" of its Brief, Freeport claims that Enerco has
attempted to "revive" the implied contract claim which Enerco
voluntarily dismissed in the trial court.

That is simply untrue.

Enerco did not allege anywhere in its Brief that the implied
contract claim should be considered by this Court. Rather, Enerco
asserted that what Freeport refers to as "extrinsic evidence" must
freeport1s Brief makes the incredible assertion that "Enerco
freely admits the Lease Agreement is not ambiguous." For whatever
reason, Freeport has apparently chosen to ignore the following
clear language on page 27 of Enercofs Brief:
The Lease Agreement's promises, including that insurance
protection would be maintained on the warehouse in
question and that Freeport would promptly repair all
damages, create, at a minimum, ambiguities as to
Freeport!s duties. Those ambiguities must be construed
against Freeport because it drafted the Lease. Those
ambiguities allow consideration of extrinsic evidence
including Freeport!s sale brochures, verbal promises and
other actions of Freeportfs employees.
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be considered to determine what is fair and reasonable in relation
to the parties' contractual duties and in determining what duties
Freeport owed relative to Enerco's negligence claim.
As indicated above, if the Lease Agreement is invalid (which
certainly appears to be the case), then the "extrinsic evidence"
which Freeport refers to must be considered to properly assess the
breach of contract claim.

Even if the effective dates of the

Agreement are ignored and it is somehow valid, then the same
evidence must be considered if any ambiguities exist.

Finally,

even if there were no breach of contract claim being made, this
"extrinsic evidence" would have to be considered to determine what
duties were created under the negligence claim.
POINT III.

ENERCO HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE

As "Point III" of its Brief, Freeport makes what Enerco
believes is its most critical error by blatantly making the
erroneous assertion (as Point "A") that "[t]here is no general duty
of a commercial landlord to furnish security to tenants."

This

assertion is directly contrary to the law of this State and almost
every other court which has considered this important issue.
The only Utah cases even mentioned as support are Eaton v.
Savage, 28 Utah 2d 353, 502 P.2d 564 (1972) and Williams v. Melbv,
99 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985).

Both of these cases support Enerco's

position in this case.
The Eaton case involved a 13 year old girl who sued the owners
of an apartment building where she was injured while walking along
a 15-inch high pipe railing used for the purpose of impeding foot
12

traffic across lawns.

This Court simply held that "[a] possessor

of land is liable to a trespassing child only if he fails to meet
the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent man under the
circumstances."

Id. at 354.

Even though the Eaton case has

nothing to do with a commercial landlord-tenant relationship or the
issues in this case, it does confirm the "reasonably prudent man"
standard of care which will be discussed in more detail below.
Likewise,
inapplicable.

the Williams

case

cited

by

Freeport

is also

In that case, the plaintiff sued the owner of her

apartment complex after she fell through a closed window.
In Williams, this Court began its analysis by noting that "a
landlord is bound by the usual standard of exercising ordinary
prudence and care" and that "he may be held liable for injuries
caused by any defects . . . of which he was aware, and which he
should reasonably foresee would expose others to an unreasonable
risk of harm."

Id., p. 726, n. 1, quoting Stephenson v. Warner,

581 P. 2d 567, 568 (Utah 1978).

This is obviously contrary to

Freeportfs suggestion that landlords cannot be liable for their
tenants1 injuries and damages.
The Williams case also explained that "the common law duty of
a landlord has been expanded in virtually every state . . . beyond
the narrow common law categories" and that "the lessee!s rights,
liabilities and expectations are more appropriately viewed as
governed by contract and general principles of tort law."
pp. 726, 727.

Id.,

This Court then concluded that "[i]n the instant

case, the landlord's duty was to use reasonable care."
13

Id., p.

727, emphasis

added.

Again, this is completely

contrary to

Freeport's erroneous assertion that "the only common-law duty Utah
courts have imposed upon landlords is the implied warranty of
habitability." (Appellee's Brief, p. 20).
Significantly, the Williams case also noted that
to

be

exercised

in

any

particular

case

fl

[t]he care

depends

upon

the

circumstances of that case and on the extent of the foreseeable
danger involved and must be determined as a question of fact." Id.
The trial court erred in rejecting this claim as a matter of law.
Finally, although discovery has not even been done yet to
determine how many other thefts had occurred at the Freeport Center
prior to these thefts, the Williams case made it clear that the
frequency of prior acts has no bearing on the foreseeability of a
future act:

"The mere fact that a particular kind of accident has

not happened before does not . . . show that such an accident is
one which might not reasonably have been anticipated."
728.

Id../ p.

This Court concluded in Williams that
a trier of fact might find that the landlord should have
known that a defective condition existed and should have
taken precautions to avert the risk. Therefore, since we
cannot hold as a matter of law that the plaintiff was
equally or more negligent than [defendants], a triable
issue of fact exists as to whether [defendants] breached
their duty of care.

IdAs will be discussed below, Utah law has indicated that there
is a duty for landlords to act reasonably and protect their clients
in all circumstances.

Because Utah law stands so contrary to

Freeportfs position in this case, its Brief does not rely on Utah
14

law, but rather one case from California, Royal Neckwear Co., Inc.
v. Century City, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1146 (1988), and one case
from Arkansas, Bartlev v. Sweester, 890 S.W.2d 250 (Ark. 1994) to
support the proposition that commercial landlords have no duty to
protect their tenants.
It is important for this Court to know just how much of a
minority

position

those

cases

represent.

After

thoroughly

researching this issue, it is Enercofs belief that these are the
only two states which have reached this conclusion.

Every other

state which has addressed this issue, including Utah, has reached
the exact opposite conclusion.2
As indicated previously, this Court has "charged landlords
with a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their tenants in all
circumstances."

Williams v. Melbv, supra at 726, emphasis added.

This Court's own research confirmed that the common law duties of
a landlord had been expanded "in virtually every state."

Id.

It appears that every state, with the exception of Arkansas
(and possibly California to a limited extent, as explained above)
have joined the overwhelming majority which holds that landlords do
2

In a case decided subsequent to the Royal Neckwear case cited
by Freeport, even California appears to have recognized the
"reasonable care" requirement. In Williams v. Saga Enterprises,
Inc., 225 Cal. App. 3d 142 (1990), the California Court of Appeals
considered a case brought by an injured passenger against a tavern
owner.
Interestingly (especially considering the fact that
Freeport was in custody of Enercofs keys when the thefts took
place), the plaintiff claimed that liability was created because
the defendant had agreed to take custody of the driver's keys. The
court indicated that this fact (taking custody of the driver's
keys) was "sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to
whether . . . Section 324 A of the Restatement [is] applicable to
this case." Id., p. 907.
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have a duty of reasonable care and that a landlord's tort liability
to its tenant hinges on foreseeability.

In Mitchell v. Pearson

Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), this Court unequivocally
held that "the fact that the instrumentality which produced the
injury . . . was the criminal conduct of a third person would not
preclude a finding of proximate cause if the intervening agency was
itself a foreseeable act." Id., p. 246. This Court explained that
"it is foreseeable that an innkeeper's failure to maintain adequate
security measures not only permits but may even encourage intruders
to rob . . . hotel patrons."

Id.

In addition to the many out-of-state cases already cited by
Enerco in its initial Brief, several other cases are important. In
Hollev v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So.2d 98 (Fla.
App. 1980), the Florida Court of Appeals rejected the defendant
landlord's arguments, including its argument that "as a matter of
law,

it had

no duty

to provide protection

against

criminal

conduct." id., p. 100. The Hollev court explained that because of
"the foreseeability of . . . crime at its premises, a jury could
properly find that a discharge of the landlord's duty to keep the
common areas reasonably

safe required that a guard or other

security measures be provided" and also indicated that this was
sufficient to create potential liability.

Id., p. 99-100.

Highly relevant to the present case is that the Hollev court
found two facts which made the case "even more convincing." First,
the court found that the landlord's practice of providing guards
"constitutes

an admissible

indication
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of the defendant's own

knowledge of the risk and the precautions necessary to meet it."
Id., p. 100, emphasis added (quoting W. Prosser# Law of Torts, §33
at 168 (4th ed. 1971)).

Second, that "the showing that part of

[tenant's] rent may have been expressly for security creates a
genuine issue concerning the landlord's contractual responsibility
to provide that protection."

Id.

Exactly as Freeport has done in this case, the defendant in
Hoilev claimed that

"it would be economically unfeasible and

practicably impossible to provide effective security for each
tenant in its sprawling . . . project."

Id., p. 100.

The court

rejected this argument, holding:
This contention, which essentially concerns the balancing
of the risks involved against the expenses required to
obviate them, may appropriately be made only to the trier
of fact.
Under our system, it is peculiarly a jury
function to determine what precautions are reasonably
required in the exercise of a particular duty of due care
[citation omitted]. That rule is plainly applicable to
this situation.
Id., pp. 100-01.
In K.S.R. v. Novak & Sons, Inc., 406 N.W.2d 636 (Neb. 1987),
the Nebraska Supreme Court considered a case in which, as in this
case, a tenant!s door had been "kicked in" and not repaired by the
landlord.

Subsequently, a criminal entered through the door.

The court first held that "a landlord has a duty to protect a
tenant against the foreseeable acts of a third person" and then
held that "a building owner who breaches such a duty may be held
liable to an individual who is injured in a reasonably foreseeable
criminal encounter that was proximately caused by the absence of
adequate security."

Id., p. 638, partially citing Waters v. New
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York City Housing Authority, 513 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357, 505 N.E.2d 922,
923

(1987).

The

court

then

concluded

that

"[q]uestions of

foreseeability, negligence, and proximate cause are questions for
the trier of fact."

Id-/ P- 639.

In Cain v. Vontz, 703 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir. 1983), the 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals applied Georgia law to a case in which a
criminal had gained access to a tenant's room through a broken
door.

In reversing summary judgment which had been entered in

favor of the landlord, the court ruled that if the criminal act was
foreseeable, the landlord would be liable.

The court then held:

It is enough that by ordinary prudence the defendant
could have foreseen that some injury or injurious
consequence might have been anticipated from the act
[numerous citations omitted]. A dangerous situation was
created when the defendant failed to repair the broken
locks . . . It would not take a very farsighted person
to be able to imagine the possible consequences of such
an action.
However, this is not for the court to
determine. Georgia courts have said numerous times that
questions
of
negligence,
proximate
cause
[and]
foreseeability . . . are properly for a jury to
determine.
Id., p. 1283.

See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §449:

"If the likelihood that a third person may act in a
particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal
does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm
caused thereby."
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §302 B:
"An act or omission may be negligent if the actor
realizes or should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct
of the other or a third person which is intended to cause
harm, even though such conduct is criminal." (Emphasis
added).
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Freeport was able to convince the trial court that this
overwhelming majority of case law and authority only applies to
residential landlord cases. This was absolute error, as this Court
has already applied these exact same standards to commercial cases
(Mitchell, supra). and has clearly indicated that "this Court has
charged landlords with a duty to exercise reasonable care in all
circumstances."

(Williams, supra at 726, emphasis added).

Doing

otherwise would not only reject the overwhelming majority of cases,
but would create serious constitutional concerns including equal
protection infringement and violations of Article I, Sections 7 and
11 of the Constitution of Utah. Rather than burden this Court with
another long list of cases, Enerco simply offers the following
summary provided in an ALR3d annotation:
Courts considering whether a landlord is under a
duty to protect his tenants against criminal activities
by third parties have made no express distinctions based
upon the purpose—residential or commercial—to which the
leased premises were devoted; and cases involving
premises leased for commercial purposes ordinarily have
been decided on the basis of the same considerations
applied in cases dealing with residential property.
43 ALR3d 331 at 363.
The trial court erred in holding that Utah law and the vast
majority of other states1 cases did not apply to Freeport because
it is a commercial

Enercofs cause of action

landlord.

for

negligence is appropriate, and the issues of foreseeability and
negligence are unquestionably issues for the jury to consider.
Freeportfs final claim under this point is that even if there
is a duty which extends to landlords, the dismissal of Enerco1s
negligence claim would be appropriate because "the failure to
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provide security was [not] a substantial causative factor leading
to the thefts." (Appellee's Brief, pp. 22-3). This argument fails
for three reasons.
First, the trial court did not even consider this argument.
Summary judgment on the negligence claim was granted solely on the
trial court's erroneous ruling that "the landlord has no duty to
protect tenants1 property from theft by third persons." (R. 1496.)
Second, if the trial court would have considered this issue,
it is unthinkable that the undisputed facts alleged by Enerco were
not a "causative factor" in the losses.

Failure to have roving

security guards obviously contributed to allowing Enerco1 s delivery
door to remained "left in pieces" for weeks and to allowing trucks
and trailers to be driven into the warehouse in question.

Failure

to have an "electronic surveillance system," as promised, certainly
contributed to the losses.

Accepting James Kimfs keys to the

warehouse so that no one else could gain entrance, and then smiling
and waving to the thieves while more than 20 trailers of Enerco1s
unique and readily-identifiable equipment were driven through the
front gate certainly contributed to the losses. Inducing Enerco to
become a tenant with undisputed

verbal

promises

and written

materials touting Freeport!s safety, security and lack of prior
thefts certainly contributed to the losses.
Perhaps this issue is moot because this Court has consistently
held for decades that proximate cause is a question of fact for the
jury.

See, e.g., Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 457 (Utah 1981);

Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P*2d 191 (1962).
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Even if the

trial court would have ruled on the issue of causation (which it
did not), this issue would still need to go to the jury.
POINT IV.

FREEPORT QUALIFIED AS A WAREHOUSEMAN

The obvious error made by Freeport in this section of its
Brief is that it begins by asserting that "a warehouseman takes
possession of another's goods under bailment."

(Appellee's Brief,

p. 25). The cases then cited by Freeport refer to bailment issues.
Freeportfs only support for its assertion is a reference to U.C.A.
70A-7-102(l)(a), which defines the term "Bailee": "'Bailee1 means
the person who by a warehouse receipt, bill of lading or other
document of title acknowledges possession of goods and contracts to
deliver them."

(Emphasis added).

To the contrary, the very same

statute separately defines the term "Warehouseman" as follows:
"'Warehouseman1 is a person engaged in the business of storing
goods for hire."

(U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(h), emphasis added).

Enerco does not believe there is any question Freeport is
"engaged in the storing of goods for hire." Many of its buildings
are used only for that very purpose.

The term "goods" is defined

as "all things which are treated as movable for the purposes of a
contract of storage or transportation."

(U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(f),

emphasis added).
Using the definition of a "bailee" (which under U.C.A. 70A-7102(1)(a) must have a "warehouse receipt, bill of lading or other
document of title acknowledging possession of goods"), Freeport
erroneously argues that one cannot be a warehouseman unless it
takes possession of goods through a warehouse receipt or other
21

document of title.

Treatises and courts across the country have

held just the opposite.

A leading UCC treatise, Anderson on the

Uniform Commercial Code, summarized that
A warehouseman is "a person engaged in the business of
storing goods for hire." It is to be noted that neither
the issuing of a receipt nor the storing in a building of
the warehouseman is an element of the definition.
Id. at §7-102:4, emphasis added.

In Butler Mfg. Co. v. Americold

Corp., 835 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Kansas 1993), the plaintiff sued the
owner of a storage facility for damages done to the plaintiff's
property. The property being stored was not something the landlord
was going to re-sell, but was only the tenant's business records.
Their agreements were "storage contracts."

In rejecting the same

argument Freeport has made, the court held:
The records clearly fall under the UCC's definition of
goods, which are defined under K.S.A. 84-7-102(1)(f)
[identical to Utah's U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(f)] as including
"all things which are treated as movable for the purposes
of a contract of storage or transportation." The court
finds that the defendants in this consolidated action
clearly are warehousemen as defined by K.S.A. 84-7102(l)(h) [identical to U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(h)]. One
need only look at the provisions in the contracts to see
that the defendants were engaged in the business of
storing goods (the records) for hire (plaintiffs were
paving them for storage). It is true that defendants did
not issue documents specifically entitled "warehouse
receipts" regarding the records, however, that is not
material in the determination of whether defendants are
warehousemen as defined by the UCC. [Citations omitted].
If the drafters of Article 7 had wished to limit the
application of its provisions to situations in which
documents specifically entitled warehouse receipts were
issued, they could easily have done so.
Id. at 1279, emphasis added.
judgment for the plaintiff.

The court then granted summary

See also Indemnity Marine Assurance
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Co. v, Lipin Robinson Warehouse Corp., 99 Mich. App. 6, 297 N.W.2d
846 (1980):
The issuance or warehouse receipts or other
documents of title by Lipin Robinson is not, in any
event, critical to a finding that Article 7 of the UCC
applies.
While most of the provisions of Article 7
specifically deal with such documents, they are not
mentioned in every provision.
It is undeniable that
Lipin Robinson is a "warehouseman" . . . . Unlike other
major articles of the code, Article 7 does not include
one basic provision outlining its scope.
Id. at 850, emphasis in original.
Freeport's claim that it had no right to take control of
plaintiff's goods is irrelevant.

An entity "in the business of

storing goods for hire" may be a warehouseman and not be entitled
to a warehouseman's lien if it does not have a warehouse receipt or
other document of title:

"Once qualified as a warehouseman, in

order to acquire a lien the warehouseman must issue a document
known as a warehouse receipt."

In re Celotex, 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d

482, 485 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct., MD Fla. 1991), emphasis added.
Freeport's standing as a warehouseman is important because
U.C.A. 70A-7-204(l) mandates that "a warehouseman is liable for
damages for loss of or injury to goods caused by his failure to
exercise such care in regard to them as a reasonably careful man
would exercise under like circumstances." Interestingly, this duty
is the same as a landlord must exercise.

Furthermore, UCC cases

have the same requirements as landlord cases in that whether the
standard was breached (and whether proximate cause exists) is left
to the jury.

See, e.g., W.A. Taylor & Co. v. Griswold & Bateman

Warehouse Co., 754 F. Supp. 1260 (N„D. Illinois 1990); United
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States Borax and Chemical Co. v. Blackhawk Warehousing and Leasing
Cg^, 586 S.W.2d 249 (Ark. App. 1979).

The trial court erred in

ruling that the UCC did not apply to this case.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. All the evidence must be evaluated in a light
most favorable to Enerco, and any doubt or uncertainty must be
resolved in its favor.

When cases involve negligence, summary

judgment is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case.
Utah law mandates that Landlords have duties to exercise
reasonable

care

"in

all

circumstances."

This

Court

has

unequivocally held that with regard to landlord cases, the care to
be exercised in any particular case depends on the circumstances of
that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved, and
must be determined

as a question of fact.

Furthermore, as

explained in Enerco!s initial Brief, Freeport's general duty in
this case was increased by the fact that it actually undertook to
render security services by providing guards at the gate, roving
security guards, etc.
Utah law requires that "the landlord's insurance is presumed
to be held for the tenant's benefit as a co-insured in the absence
of an express agreement to the contrary." No such agreement to the
contrary exists and it is undisputed that Enerco paid the premiums.
Freeport owed Enerco the duties of a warehouseman, and is
statutorily liable for the loss of Enercofs goods.
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There is no

evidence that Enerco is a "bailee" as asserted by Freeport.
The only Lease Agreement considered by the trial court (or
before

this Court)

is

invalid

according

Therefore, other evidence of contractual
considered.

to

its own terms.

obligations must be

Even if the Lease Agreement were valid, multiple

ambiguities exist which would also require the consideration of the
other, undisputed evidence referenced above.

Freeport!s acts and

omissions set forth herein breached the agreements between the
parties, and any ambiguities must be construed against Freeport.
For all of these reasons, Enerco submits that the trial court
erred and respectfully requests that the judgment entered in favor
of Freeport be reversed as set forth herein.
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